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Abstract This paper introduces a GIS-based model that simulates the geographic
expansion of transport networks by several decision-makers with varying objec-
tives. The model progressively adds extensions to a growing network by choosing
the most attractive investments from a limited choice set. Attractiveness is defined
as a function of variables in which revenue and broader societal benefits may play a
role and can be based on empirically underpinned parameters that may differ
according to private or public interests. The choice set is selected from an
exhaustive set of links and presumably contains those investment options that best
meet private operator’s objectives by balancing the revenues of additional fare
against construction costs. The investment options consist of geographically plau-
sible routes with potential detours. These routes are generated using a fine-meshed
regularly latticed network and shortest path finding methods. Additionally, two
indicators of the geographic accuracy of the simulated networks are introduced. A
historical case study is presented to demonstrate the model’s first results. These
results show that the modelled networks reproduce relevant results of the histori-
cally built network with reasonable accuracy.
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1 Introduction
The expansion of transport networks is considered an important factor for the spatial
distribution of activities and receives considerable politic and academic attention. It
is commonly perceived as a technology diffusion process in which the innovation
spreads geographically (Gru¨bler 1990; Nakicenovic 1995). The geographic paths
that the developed networks assume have important societal and economic
ramifications. Ideally these paths constitute a social optimum considering
construction costs and generalized travel costs. However, due to often non-
cooperative decision-makers (Knick Harley 1982; Dobbin and Dowd 1997; Xie and
Levinson 2011), potential transport network expansion outcomes may be limited to
Nash equilibria (Bala and Goyal 2000; Anshelevich et al. 2003) that can entail
considerable extra costs to reach a target state of connectivity.
Although it is known that transport network expansion may follow a clear
rationale, largely based on, e.g. expected transport flows versus costs (Rietveld and
Bruinsma 1998; Xie and Levinson 2011), relatively little is known about how
economic and institutional conditions affect transport network expansion. This is
partially because, in contrast to other instruments available to transport planners
such as land-use and transport demand models, ex ante models of transport network
expansion are few and they are hardly ever empirically validated. For a
comprehensive overview of transport network modelling, we refer to Xie and
Levinson (2009). In the 1960s, conceptual and empirical modelling efforts have
been undertaken by quantitative geographers (Taaffe et al. 1963; Warntz 1966;
Kolars and Malin 1970). More recently, network optimality and bi-level optimiza-
tion methods (Patriksson 2008; Youn et al. 2008; Li et al. 2010), the role of self-
organization (Xie and Levinson 2011) and the role of ownership (Xie and Levinson
2007) have been investigated in controlled conditions. This has been followed by
empirically based exercises to test heuristic network design optimization methods
(Vitins and Axhausen 2009), to understand the driving forces of network growth
(Rietveld and Bruinsma 1998) and the role of first mover advantages (Levinson and
Xie 2011) and to forecast future network investments in a fairly mature transport
system (Levinson et al. 2012).
An instrument to evaluate geographically explicit network expansion outcomes in
settings with multiple decision-makers is not yet available in the literature. This is
presumably because of limited data availability, computational limitations and
difficulties in reproducing topologically realistic links or ‘shortcuts’ (Li et al. 2010).
The aim of this paper is to introduce transport link scanner (TLS), an agent-based
model that simulates the overall geographic diffusion of a transport network through
the individual investment decisions that drive network expansion, and to demonstrate
that it is able to reproduce a historical network expansion process reasonably
accurate. The model allows the inclusion of multiple decision-makers with varying
objectives; institutional conditions and the level of cooperation between decision-
makers can be explicitly modelled. A novel heuristic method is integrated to generate
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the plausible geographic paths of potential investments that aim to maximize fares. It
does so in a manner that is consistent with the model’s transport demand module and
is responsive to previously selected links. The principal model output is a network of
transport links, which enables the measurement of model performance based on
graph-theoretic indicators such as diameter and node degree (Rodrigue et al. 2006),
and indicators relevant to transportation networks such as accessibility and network
efficiency (Jacobs-Crisioni et al. 2016). The model is illustrated with a case study in
which the start and expansion of the Dutch railway network in the nineteenth and
early twentieth century is simulated, but the model itself is developed in such a way
that other applications may be configured reasonably easily.
The theoretical basis, overall structure and key assumptions are outlined in Sect. 2.
Subsequently, particular aspects of TLS are described in more detail in Sect. 3. The
case study is described in Sect. 4, and simulation results for that case study are given
in Sect. 5. This is followed by general conclusions on the development of TLS and
ideas for further research in Sect. 6. Lastly, the estimation of cost and demand
functions, a breakdown of model results per investor type and a table of nomenclature
are given in appendices. Before the model and case study are introduced, it is worth
mentioning that this model is programmed in the Geo Data and Model Server
(GeoDMS) software (ObjectVision 2014), which is presumably best known as the
platform that supports land-use models such as Land-Use Scanner and the Land-Use-
based Integrated Sustainability Assessment modelling platform (LUISA) (Hilferink
and Rietveld 1999; Baranzelli et al. 2014). GeoDMS is rather different from
commonly used GIS packages, and we emphasize here that its availability has been a
key prerequisite for the development of TLS. It is an open-source platform that
interprets scripts into a sequence of operations and executes these operations on
dynamically defined C?? arrays. Just like geospatial semantic array programming
tools such as the Mastrave library (de Rigo et al. 2013), GeoDMS adheres to large-
scale modelling and assessment tasks. The major advantages of using GeoDMS for
the work presented in this paper are considerable gains in computation speed,
reproducibility of modelling steps, flexibility and control over data operations and
straightforward links between various data types such as raster and vector type spatial
data. The TLS program and the data that have been used for this paper are freely
available through http://www.jacobs-crisioni.nl/publications/download_tls.
2 Model structure and key assumptions
Transport network expansion is commonly initiated by a technical innovation that
can substantially lower generalized travel costs, such as the introduction of steam
power or the invention of motorways (Nakicenovic 1995). The expansion process
itself is the result of sequential decisions to construct transport links for that new
technology. Transport link investments generally come with considerable set-up
costs and sunk costs and are physically bound, thus making it hard for investors to
move their enterprise (Xie and Levinson 2011). The involved decision-makers may
be private or public and may have very different objectives, including economic and
societal factors, but are generally concerned with providing transport service for
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which the built infrastructure is instrumental. Because of the high costs of market
access, in many cases the transport market is an oligopoly subject to fierce
competition (Knick Harley 1982; Veenendaal 1995). Thus, potential final network
outcomes consist of Nash equilibria rather than a social optimum (Anshelevich et al.
2003; Xie and Levinson 2007; Youn et al. 2008).
Given high costs of link construction, it stands to reason that investment
decisions are taken with deliberation and that an investor will decide to construct the
link that best fits investor objectives. The high costs involved in link construction
create local monopolies when largely exhausted revenues block competitor
investments in the same space (Xie and Levinson 2011). The position of the first
investor is further boosted by the existence of network externalities that imply that
newly added links may increase revenues for the existing network. This leads to
advantages for the established playing field, as can be seen in the first mover
advantages and lock-in described by network economics. For an overview of
network economics, we refer to Economides (1996). All in all, sequential link
construction is a dynamic process in which previous decisions organize the potential
for future decisions. The characteristics of network expansion processes are the
basis for the ‘strongest link’ assumption of transport network expansion (Xie and
Levinson 2011), which is adopted in this paper. In such an approach, any agent
selects a most attractive investment for construction, if a sufficiently attractive
option is available. After that decision, investments are reconsidered and
construction decisions are taken iteratively until the pool of sufficiently attractive
investments is exhausted.
2.1 Model structure
Especially when network expansion is driven by economic motives, the spatial
distribution of suitable terrain and potential transport revenues may be presumed to
be important aspects of the choice process. This may be one reason why railways
prefer paths with high potential interaction values (Warntz 1966; Kolars and Malin
1970). The geographic nature of these factors supports GIS-based modelling such as
in TLS. In TLS network, investments are drawn from a pool of potential network
extensions with plausible geographic paths. That selection of extensions is based on
a set of adaptable rules. The modelled network investments are discrete choices.
The model is turn-based and dynamic: thus, one investment decision from one
investor is allocated in any iteration, causing one distinct link to be added to the
modelled transport network. The transport link allocated in that iteration affects the
market conditions that are relevant for the generated choice set and for the estimated
revenues of investments in subsequent turns. The model allows multiple investors to
construct network links, such as private investors or governments. The partaking
investors are allowed differing investment objectives.
The model is comprised of four modules that are tasked with: (1) the preferences
and the financial capacity of partaking investors; (2) the generation of a choice set;
(3) the estimation of investment attractiveness; and (4) the selection of an
investment. The model structure is outlined in Fig. 1. All elements of the model will
be treated in the following sections.
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2.2 Key assumptions
The investment decisions are assumed to be determined by repeatedly selecting the
most attractive combination of investment and investor from a limited number of
alternatives. The attractiveness of these options is governed by a conditional logit
model (McFadden 1974), which is chosen because the multi-investor nature of TLS
causes that variables differ for different investors. That condition excludes the
mixed logit models used by, for example, Levinson and Karamalaputi (2003).
Distinct choices are treated as separate trials, in which an observed addition to the
railway network is chosen from a set H of alternative–investor combinations. H
contains a finite number of alternative–investor combinations O with index
l = 1,…,L, and known attributes. This choice set is composed of a number of likely
additions. Then, the probability that alternative o is realized equals:





which is repeated for each choice situation.
It contains the estimated attractiveness function Sl for a line I given investor type
















Module handling scenario sengs
Module handling input data
Loads concurrent model state and 
populaon distribuon
Module for choice set generaon
Esmates changes in demand and
evaluates opmal paths
Module for esmang trip 
generaon and network allocaon
Module for aggregang operator-
speciﬁc demand eﬀects, compung 
accessibility impacts, other goals
Module for link selecon and storage
Fig. 1 Structure of one model iteration in TLS and the model’s various modules. In each iteration, one
investment, identified as a link between two zones, is allocated to the current transport network
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Sl ¼ b0pROIl þ bnpXnl þ Rp þ Rl þ e; ð2Þ
where ROIl indicates the return on investment that investors presumably seek. This
is modelled by the estimated increase in passenger mileage on an investor’s net-
work, divided by the estimated costs of building the link; Xn is a vector of variables
used to capture other factors that affect the attractiveness of investment options; Rp
and Rl are alternative-specific and investor-specific random components that ensure
that the model does not yield multiple alternatives with identical probabilities; and e
is a random disturbance.
The attractiveness of alternatives may differ per investor and may contain a
variety of different social or financial objectives. In the presented case study,
investor-specific attractiveness functions have been estimated using railway
investment choices taken while constructing the Dutch railway network and mainly
aim at increasing the revenues (reflected by passenger kilometres) on the investor’s
network; in other cases, these attractiveness functions need to be modified to reflect
case-specific investor goals or transport revenue types.
The selection of investment choices and the computation of investment
attractiveness is constrained by the following assumptions: (1) the territory is
divided into a given number of zones with estimable numbers of potential
passengers and/or movable goods, observed as origins (i) and destinations (j);
furthermore, (2) all zones are already connected by a preceding base communi-
cations network (base), so that spatial interactions already exist before the transport
mode is introduced. This network is expected to have maximum plausible
connectivity, so that the i to j travel distances Lbaseij obtained from this network
are the minimum realistic link lengths between two zones. A last constraining
assumption (3) is that the introduced transport mode is expected to lower
generalized travel costs per kilometre with a fixed relative cost improvement factor
u.
We must emphasize that the value of u has a considerable impact on results of
the network allocation model. In this study, relative general cost improvements
depend on the transport speeds on the base network (Vbase) and the transport speeds
on the introduced network (V intr), so that V intr=Vbase ¼ u: One implication of the
model’s assumptions is that the links l in the modelled network have travel costs c
based on cbasel ¼ Ll=Vbase or cintrl ¼ Ll=V intr; where Ll indicate link lengths. In the
case of public transport, it seems fair to adapt travel cost estimates with travel cost
penalties cp to simulate the effort involved in entering and exiting the introduced
transport network. This leads to fixed maximum obtainable travel cost improve-
ments between two zones, which can be computed as a ratio between minimum
new-mode travel costs cminij and existing travel costs c
base
ij over the base network.
Maximum obtainable travel cost improvements are expressed as:
cbaseij =c
min








in which maximum factor improvements are computed as base travel costs divided
by minimum achievable travel costs. Those factors in turn are computed as network
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length divided by base transport mode speed, and minimum travel costs are com-
puted as the time used to transverse the same network length using the introduced
transport mode plus fixed travel cost penalties to enter and exit the introduced
transport mode. Thus, travel costs improvements are assumed to have a fixed
maximum, which has important ramifications for the selection of a choice set. This
can be seen in the following sections.
3 Choice set generation, investment selection and model accuracy
measures
Although in continuous space infinite potential links exist, computational limita-
tions force us to work with a limited choice set. This is justified by the property of
the conditional logit model demonstrated by McFadden (1974) that drawing a
limited number of alternatives leads to consistent estimates, provided that the true
choice process is described by the estimation procedure.1 TLS establishes a set of
discrete choice set alternatives by drawing samples with a reasonable probability of
selection using heuristic generation methods. In the attractiveness estimation
procedure, the built links are added to the choice set. Because of the dynamic nature
of TLS, the choice sets used in prediction are bound to differ from those used in the
estimation process, and we must therefore assume that the validity of estimated
attractiveness functions holds as long as investment options are selected with the
same criteria as the choice set used in the estimations.
We furthermore assume that link construction is incremental, which implies that
the most profitable link construction investments are selected first, and later, other
links are built as extensions to the investor’s network. To generate investment
options given these assumptions, a two-stage method is applied, which first deals
with the selection of terminating zones and later selects a plausible path between the
terminating points using corridor location searching methods. For a recent overview
of corridor location search methods, we refer to Scaparra et al. (2014). For this
section, it is necessary to explicitly discern links (l), which we consider as complete
investments between two terminating zones, and segments (s), which are the
separately observed lines in the model of which a link is composed.
3.1 Selecting terminating zones
The investment options are picked from a subset of zone pairs with high revenues
compared to costs. We compute a first estimate of the relative revenue-to-cost ratio
(RCR) of a potential new link by dividing additional passenger kilometres by
construction costs C:
1 An assumption of multinomial logit models is independence of irrelevant alternatives. There have been
some recent attempts to develop sampling strategies that may overcome this assumption; see, for
example, Guevara and Ben-Akiva (2013). However, it is beyond the scope of the present paper to try and
apply such methods, in particular since the generation of meaningful links is not trivial, as can be seen in
the rest of the paper.
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RCRest1ij ¼ Lbaseij Test1ij þ Test1ji  Tcurrij  Tcurrji
 
=Cest1ij ; ð4Þ
where Lbaseij is a first estimate of link length defined as the shortest distance between i
and j in kilometres over the base network; T is the potential number of trips in both
directions with (est1) and without (curr) the new link; and Cest1ij is a first estimate of
construction costs.
Lengths and costs are assumed to be symmetric for both directions. We must
emphasize here that the link lengths and flows for potential investments are rough
estimates, because at this step in the selection procedure the optimal path of a
potential link between i and j is not yet known and as a consequence, neither are the
definitive travel times. The construction costs are obtained by finding the least-cost
path between zones given estimated construction costs for each potential network
segment. These construction costs are imposed on a fine-meshed network of
regularly distributed segments, which is elaborated upon later.
Potential trips T between zones are computed using a spatial interaction model
derived from Alonso’s General Theory of Movements (GTM) (Alonso 1978). It
must be emphasized that in the model these formulations can be easily substituted
by any other spatial interaction formulation, for example to take into account spatial
dependencies (Patuelli and Arbia 2013), heterogeneity or endogeneity (Donaghy











































where P represents zonal populations; cbaseij describes travel costs over the base
network; ccurrij describes current travel costs obtained from the network at the start of
the model’s iteration, thus including already allocated investments; cest1ij approxi-
mates travel costs if the potential investment is in place and is computed as
cest1ij ¼ Lbaseij =V intr; f(.) is a distance-decay function; c and h are parameters that
govern transport consumption elasticity for reduced travel costs; and Bj is a desti-
nation-specific constant that may be used to model congestion at destinations.
The computed levels of RCRest1ij are instrumental to select a pool of potentially
high revenue-to-cost ratio investments from which investment options in O are
selected. To exclude lines that offer relatively small total travel cost improvements
between two terminating zones, the line proposed in cest1ij must offer minimally half
the maximum travel cost improvements that may be obtained by substituting a base
network link with the link considered. Furthermore, intrazonal links and
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symmetrical elements in the matrix are excluded. These criteria yield the following
selection dummy Zij:












The criterion is admittedly chosen ad hoc, but seems to be a reasonable
assumption. This selection criterion is necessary to obtain a small choice set with
reasonably plausible alternatives. Note that in the case that cp[ 0; proposed links
between i and j also have an absolute minimum distance, because with lower
distances the rail link’s travel cost including waiting times does not offer sufficient
travel cost advantages. Finally, a fixed number of links between i and j with the
highest values of RCRest1ij Zij are selected as investment options.
3.2 Finding plausible paths
Simply connecting two zones without detours leads to the odd situation that the link
does not serve the zones that it passes. Optimal transport lines may ‘depart from the
straight line’ when a detour improves the balance between revenues and
construction costs (Morrill 1970). The links between selected terminating zone
pairs are therefore allowed to detour. Three factors are taken into account in the path
selection mechanism, namely potential revenues, construction costs and the overall
length of the link. These are used to obtain optimal paths given revenue-to-cost
ratios based on differently weighted combinations of the three factors. In all cases,
optimal paths are searched that meet a minimum travel cost improvement. Thus, the
maximum length of a link Lintrmaxij is a logical consequence of the maximum travel
cost improvements in (3), u; and the criterion used in Eq. (6), and is defined as:





so that to achieve the maximum link distance, the maximum acceptable travel costs
are multiplied with the speed of the introduced transport model. To obtain optimal
paths, the continuous space in which built lines are determined is approximated by a
regularly formed network of potential line segments, in which equally distributed
nodes connect the nearest nodes in a set number of directions (see Fig. 2). This is a
common approach in corridor location problems (Goodchild 1977; Scaparra et al.
2014). The spatial resolution of this network is 1 km 9 1 km 9 32 directions so
that network density r = 4. The used method differs somewhat from known solu-
tions to corridor location problems. The key difference is that the used method
depends on the outcomes of previous model iterations and may yield different
results in subsequent model iterations. To allow for this, the regularly latticed
network is combined with the network already built at the start of the model’s
iteration and with segments that connect the simulated rail network to zone cen-
troids. The combined network and a shortest path finding algorithm are used to
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obtain a path with an optimal combination of revenues, construction costs and
length.
The revenue-cost indicators per segment s are computed as:
RCs ¼ Rs=Csð Þ1k=Ls; ð8Þ
where Rs indicates estimated revenues obtained from the segment; Cs indicates costs
of segment construction; and Ls indicates segment lengths. This formula puts a high
weight on the revenue-to-cost ratio for low values of k, while the least lengthy path
is favoured in case k = 1. The method to estimate segment revenues will be
explained later. Construction costs are obtained from terrain characteristics. To
model additive network construction, already built railway segments are given a
very low cost of one. Note that more sophisticated cost structures for existing links
can be configured to simulate specific cooperation conditions. Finally, segment




The inverse RC1S is used as a measure of friction for each segment.
Subsequently, Dijkstra’s least-friction path algorithm is applied to find a path
between the terminating zones with the lowest total friction. Clearly, this approach
provides the possibility to obtain optimal paths according to a limited set of
parameterized factors. Because methods to obtain real parameter values for path
selection are not yet available, we iterate the importance of segment revenue-to-cost
ratios using the k parameter. Thus, the shortest path finding algorithm with RC1S is
repeated in 40 iterations, in which k is gradually increased from zero to one. The
total inverse revenue-cost indicator of a path is:
Fig. 2 Schematic example of a regularly formed network with equally dispersed nodes shown as stars,
segments from the centre node shown as regular lines and exemplary additional segments shown as
dashed lines (left); example of the regularly formed network shown as dashed lines and potentially
derived link shown as regular bold line positioned over a map of Amsterdam in 1842 (right)








Ls= Cs=Rsð Þ1k: ð9Þ
For k = 0, this amounts to a distance-weighted sum of inverse revenue-to-cost
ratios, while for k = 1 it is simply total distance.
3.2.1 Estimating segment revenues
The revenues for each segment are estimated using a relatively straightforward
method. Explicitly taking into account revenues with different railroad line
geometries might require repetitive re-estimation of transport demand with various
path alternatives, which is computationally infeasible. We therefore take the
potential fare of a link as a proxy for potential revenues. This can be partially done
by taking into account the amount of people in the zones that a link connects. To
take into account that zones which are already connected to the network might
suffer from transport market saturation, we also include MS, which approximates






ij  Lbaseij Tbaseij
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ij  Lbaseij Tbaseij
h i  ; ð10Þ
in which the relative amount of passenger kilometres that can be obtained by
connecting a zone is estimated, given a base level of passenger kilometres
(Lbaseij T
base




ij Þ and the presumed
maximum number of passenger kilometres (Lbaseij T
est1
ij ). MSi is zero if the market is
fully saturated and one if there is no saturation whatever. Finally, the segments’
revenue levels are estimated as average non-saturated potential revenues in the





MSi Pis1 þ 1ð Þ þ
Xn
i¼1
MSi Pis2 þ 1ð Þ
" #
; ð11Þ
where revenues R of segments s are computed by means of the population P of zone
i in which the segment’s first point (s1) and last point (s2) are located and the zone’s
saturation factor MSi. One person is added to each zone to ensure that values of Rs
are above zero and thus warrant the computation of Eq. (9).
3.2.2 Optimal path selection
The iterative path finding method leaves 40 alternative paths with varying lengths.
These varying lengths signify a varying mix of revenue-cost optimization and length
reduction. We must acknowledge that in some cases the method captures many
alternatives with similar geometries, thus causing inefficiencies in the alternative
path generation. An extension of the model using recent advances in corridor
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location problems such as those proposed by Scaparra et al. (2014) may be explored
in the future to solve this. To find the likely most profitable path, the passenger
kilometre increases obtained are recomputed for the whole i to j matrix, for which
the travel costs and travel distances between connected zones are repeatedly re-
estimated for every value of k. To do so, a dummy variable Qi indicates whether
zone i is connected to the alternative path at hand. Subsequently, the estimated
travel costs ccurrij and travel distances L
base
ij between all connected zones are updated
so that cest kij and L
est k
ij are defined for each alternative path k as:
cest kij ¼









which enables a more accurate estimate of revenues within the scope of the con-
nected zones. Lbaseij is used in (13) because a shortest length finding method on the
current network would always represent the geographically more efficient base
network, regardless of the state of the introduced transport mode. As with the first
estimate, revenues from not directly connected zones are neglected here. This is a
necessary evil to prevent excessive computational requirements in this stage of the
modelling exercise. Furthermore, the sum of segment construction costs is taken so
that the overall cost of the path for the iteration is known as Cest k. These new cost
and revenue estimates are used to estimate path revenue-cost indicators using:














Finally, the overall length of the link is computed as Lintr k and used to obtain the


















In Eq. (15), the length of links is purposely squared to enforce that the shortest
path is only selected if no path is found that meets the Lintr maxij criterion.
Subsequently, the path with the highest value of RCR is selected. In this way, the
path with the highest estimated revenue-to-cost ratios is selected if a path that meets
the length criterion is found, and else the method picks the path with the shortest
overall length.
It is important to note that two additional restrictions are imposed on the path
decision method: first, we assume that railway network construction is incremental,
so that a) in all cases, if a link starts or terminates in a zone already connected by a
built line, the generated line must connect to the line already built there and b) the
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links of an investor’s already existing network have negligible costs for the
considered expansion; second, to simulate that built railway links terminated outside
contemporary urban areas, the link may not start on a node less than 500 metres
away from the zone’s centroid. This approximates the distance between stations and
urban area centres that are observable in the historically built network.
3.3 Investment selection
Subsequently, the attractiveness of the investment options is computed. A wide
range of variables that deal with investor objectives can be computed here.
Increasing mileage, total transport flows or reduction in congestion due to
insufficient transport network capacity are, presumably, generally important reasons
for transport network investments. TLS therefore includes a module to model
expected transport flows on potential network extensions, on the investor’s
remaining network or on the whole transport network.
For all investment options generated in the choice set, the attractiveness is
estimated with the methods shown in the previous section, yielding values of Sl
specific for each investor in a vector that is as long as the number of active investors
times the number of options. A very small random component is added to the
computed attractiveness values to warrant that two options do not have identical
attractiveness. Based on the estimated values, Eq. (1) is solved to obtain
probabilities for the considered investments. Ultimately, the investment with the
highest probability is selected. The new link and its relevant attributes are added to
the already existing network in a new file; this file may form the basis for the
evaluation of a subsequent investment if need be.
3.4 Measuring model accuracy
The primary goal of this paper is to demonstrate that modelling transport network
development with reasonable geographic accuracy is feasible. Xie and Levinson
(2011) use rank correlations to verify to what degree their model captures the
sequence of links accurately. Unfortunately this only works if the modelling is
restricted to the topology of the observed network, which is not the case in TLS. A
visual inspection of allocation results yields useful insights, but does not provide the
possibility to assess the accuracy of the model at hand in a balanced and objective
manner, for which accuracy indicators and a baseline comparison are necessary.
Although many network-based indicators to compare modelling results are
conceivable such as the ones provided by Rodrigue et al. (2006), we concentrate
on two indicators that deal with geographically relevant aspects of the results. One
indicator measures to what degree the same zones are connected as have been
connected by the historically built line; and the other indicator measures differences
in travel times. Because we assume that model accuracy is more critical for
populous areas, all indicators are weighted by population. Weighted connection
error WCE is thus measured as:



















where X is a zone-specific dummy that takes the value one when a municipality is
connected by the modelled and observed railway networks, and zero otherwise.
Essentially this measure indicates to which degree the zones that were connected
by the really built network are being connected by the modelled network, and it thus
only measures double positives. We believe this is sufficient for the scope of this
paper but plan to develop a wider range of indicators in further exercises. The



















where the absolute population-weighted differences between the observed and
modelled travel times are expressed as percentage of the observed travel times, and
the final results are subsequently averaged. Naturally, in both the modelled and
historical networks the same rules regarding waiting times and travel speeds are
upheld to enable a fair comparison of travel times.
To ensure a meaningful comparison, modelled networks are compared with the
state of the historically built network that is closest to the modelled network in terms
of length. Thus, if in the fourth investment turn, a modelled network has a length of
1000 km, subsequent individual historical investments are tested for cumulative
length until the historical investment is selected that brought the historically built
network the closest to a 1000-km cumulative length. The network comprising that
and previous investments is selected for comparison. In addition, the population
levels of the year in which the selected historical investment is built are selected to
serve as weights for the presented indicators.
4 Case study
In this section, we present an effort to simulate the development of the Dutch
railway network in the nineteenth and early twentieth century using TLS.
Investment attractiveness functions were fitted on observed transport network
investments. First the history of the development of that railway network is
summarized, after which the model set-up, main assumptions and estimation of
transport link attractiveness are outlined.
4.1 The development of the Dutch railway network
The first railway in the Netherlands opened in 1839 (Veenendaal 2008). It was
operated by the ‘Holland Iron Railway Company’ (HSM) and linked Amsterdam to
Haarlem. It was soon extended towards Rotterdam. Subsequently, competing
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companies built their own lines in the Netherlands. More than ten operators have
separately provided railway services on railway links in the Netherlands. The Dutch
government began participating actively by building state lines defined in the
Railway Acts of 1860 and 1875. Most of those state lines were run by the ‘State
Railways’ (SR), a private company which leased lines owned by the state. In 1878, a
third Act followed that allowed for the cheaper construction of railways, if operated
with slow light trains. Supported by attractive loans from the Dutch State and
subsidies from local governments (Doedens and Mulder 1989), this Railway Act
incited the construction of ‘local tracks’ that typically connected rural areas to the
main railway network (Veenendaal 2008) and were often subsidized by local
governments. In this paper, we treat state involvement as the introduction of other
types of investors with distinct preferences in the railway development playing field.
After an initial slow start, railway development began to pick up speed in the
1850s when additional operators and the Dutch state began to participate in network
development (see Fig. 3). In total, 25 operators have operated rail lines in the
country according to the data observed in this study. Increasing competition led to
considerable growth in the length of the railway network between 1860 and 1890.
Many operators could not keep up, and in 1890 the infrastructure of the third largest
railway operator (‘NRS’) was nationalized. After this, the railway transport market
was almost completely in hands of HSM and SR. In 1917, decreasing revenues
forced HSM and SR to cooperate within an institutional framework in which Dutch
policies regarding railroad operations shifted from pro-competition to pro-cartel.
Finally, in 1936 all railway infrastructure was nationalized, and operations were
continued by the state. By 1936, opportunities for further railway network
expansion evidently were exhausted and the network did not expand any further
until the 1980s.
4.2 Population distribution, network speeds and network ownership
Based on Veenendaal (2008) and Stationsweb (2009), the historical railway network
development in the Netherlands has been reconstructed in a GIS database that also
contains population counts from 1830 to 1930 in 1076 municipalities. The data,
furthermore, build on the same assumptions as in Koopmans et al. (2012), of which
we now list the most important ones. The study area is assumed to already have an



















Fig. 3 Length of railway lines in the Netherlands over time
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nineteenth century, horse-drawn boats through the country’s tow canals were the
main long distance travel mode and often the only alternative to walking to most
people. They operated at a speed that was but slightly faster than walking. We must
acknowledge that the historical networks of paved roads and tow canals are not
taken into account explicitly; instead, just as Koopmans et al. (2012), we consider
both networks to be regional substitutes for each other that are approximated using
one simplified network. In the case study, that network connects each municipality
with its five nearest neighbours. A speed Vbase ¼ 6 km=h is maintained as the
average speed to traverse this network to proxy movement over roads and
waterways. We assume this is a reasonably accurate assumption for the Netherlands.
One model variant is run with Vbase ¼ 4 km=h to test model sensitivity for this
setting.
Municipalities are represented by means of their geographic centres. The base
network has direct connections between those centroids. The rail network is
connected to those centroids through connector road links. Train schedules or the
accelerating and decelerating of trains are not explicitly modelled, but are
approximated by imposing relatively low average speeds for the introduced
transport links. To proxy that passengers lose some time with entering and exiting
the rail network as well as with transferring between physically separate rail
networks, a relatively small travel cost penalty cp ¼ 10 min is given to all
connectors between rail networks and municipalities.
When assessing the attractiveness of investments, links of the previously
modelled network extensions are included as well as the underlying network. As
given in Sect. 4.3, passenger transport demand is an important reason for
investment. The level of demand depends on generalized transport cost, which is
proxied by travel time, and on price elasticity. This makes the modelled speeds on
the railway network and assumptions on price elasticity a key factor for network
outcomes. To take these factors into account, we present scenarios with varying
travel-time improvements and with varying assumptions on price elasticity of
passenger transport demand. Construction costs, passenger demand and price
elasticity have been estimated using observed data. Details of the method used, data
and results can be found in Appendices 1 and 2.
To model railway network expansion in a case with multiple investors with
varying objectives, five independent investors are simulated. This set of investors
consists of two regular private investors, two private local line investors and the
state and roughly resembles the playing field during Dutch railway construction.
The regular private investors partake in investments from the model start. The state
partakes from 1860; local line investors from 1879. At any point, the investment–
investor combination with the highest probability is selected. All investors are
eligible to the same investments with attributes that may differ per investor; ten
investment options are available in every round. The built lines are assumed to be
operated by the building investor, so that all revenues from an investor’s line are
therefore assumed to fall to that investor. In the presented case study, the modelled
investment sequence starts in 1839, with one investment allowed every year. After
an investment, an operator is excluded one round to simulate financial recuperation
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and evaluation of the investment. Municipal population counts are updated every
decade. If the model does not find any suitable investments, it skips years to a
following decade; if it does no longer find suitable investments in 1930, the network
expansion sequence ends.
Because both travel speed improvements and price elasticity can only be roughly
estimated, we present a range of scenarios in which those assumptions vary
considerably. In one scenario, train speeds are three times faster than the pedestrian
network, so that average speed of train trips is defined as V intr ¼ 18 km=h and
Vbase ¼ 6 km=h, and total municipal transport consumption is affected by changes
in travel times (scenario A). The level of elasticity is given as c as in Eq. (5a). In
scenario C, trains speeds are 7.5 times faster than the pedestrian network, with
V intr ¼ 30 km=h and Vbase ¼ 4 km=h, while municipal transport consumption is
inelastic (scenario C). In four other scenarios, train speeds are five times faster, with
V intr ¼ 30 km=h and Vbase ¼ 6 km=h, while municipal transport consumption is
again inelastic (scenarios B1 to B4). In scenario B1, only train speed and transport
consumption are changed. To understand the sensitivity of the model for other
model assumptions, further variations in rules are simulated in scenarios B2 to B4.
In scenario B2, investors are not excluded in the round directly following an
investment. In scenarios B3 and B4, only regular private investors are modelled, so
that state lines and local line investors are excluded in the simulations. In scenario
B3, investors are assumed to be competitors, while in scenario B4, investors are
assumed to be co-dependent. Co-dependency is approximated by adding the relative
change in passenger mileage on the competitor network to the attractiveness
function of an investment. All used scenarios are summarized in Table 1. We must
acknowledge that this is not a complete sensitivity analysis in which all assumptions
are varied independently. That is an almost impossible task, given the number of
assumptions in the model and the minimum 10 days needed for one model run even
Table 1 The scenarios used
Scenario Description u and
ðV intr=VbaseÞ
c
A Slow trains, elastic consumption 3 (18/6) 0.3
B1 Fast trains, inelastic consumption 5 (30/6) 0
B2 As B1, but investors are not excluded directly after an investment 5 (30/6) 0
B3 As B1, but only private investors 5 (30/6) 0
B4 As B3, but change in passenger mileage on competitor network is a
factor for investment attractiveness
5 (30/6) 0
C Slower walking speeds, B5 parameters 7.5 (30/4) 0
Rietveld and
Bruinsma
Reproduction of Rietveld and Bruinsma (1998) 5 (30/6) 0
Parameter u indicates relative speed improvement as a ratio of the speed of the introduced transport mode
V intr versus the speed of prior transport modes Vbase; see Sect. 2.2. Parameter c indicates transport
consumption elasticity, see Eqs. (5a)–(5c)
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on a, at the time of writing, high-end 2.6 Ghz Xeon PC. In any case, such a
sensitivity analysis is outside of the scope of this paper. For future applications, we
propose to pinpoint parameters that are crucial to conclusion validity and test model
sensitivity for these parameters.
Measuring performance is meaningless without a baseline comparison of
accuracy. To compare relative model performance, the model described by Rietveld
and Bruinsma (1998) has been approximated using the TLS framework. The
Rietveld and Bruinsma method repeatedly adds a straight line between the two cities
that yield the highest expected return on investment. Only the 35 most populous
cities in the country are taken into account. Costs are equal to length, with the
exception of links that cross large waterbodies; those links cost a factor 20 more. No
fixed costs or minimum travel times are applied, and varying investor differences
are not accounted for. This model is implemented in TLS by selecting the highest
value of Eq. (4), taking into account only the original subset of 35 cities. One link is
added in every model iteration. All links are assumed to be private lines. The
plausible paths method in Sect. 3.2 is adapted to exclude variation in estimated link
revenues. The allocation procedure is finished when the pool of available cities is
exhausted. We must note that a comparison with a socially optimal network (Li
et al. 2010) is also useful here; further work is needed to establish norms for
optimality and generate a meaningful optimum.
4.3 Investment choices
Because inland water transport provided the Dutch freight sector, a cheap substitute
for rail passenger transport was a particularly important service for Dutch railway
investors (Filarski and Mom 2008). Furthermore, railways have been considered to
possess unifying qualities (Veenendaal 2008), which were presumably sought after
by the Dutch administration in the nineteenth century. Although the ‘United
Provinces’ created in the seventeenth century had become a centrally led monarchy
by 1806, the country was only starting to form a political union when the railways
began to develop (Kossmann 1986).
To investigate the motives of investment decisions in the development of the
Dutch railway network, the conditional logit choice model in (1) has been fitted on
sets of built and unbuilt railway links. Investments were separated into regular
private lines, private lines that comply with local track legislation, and state lines.
As noted before, return on investment is assumed to be the key driving force.
Revenues are expected to be linear with travelled distances; this cannot be validated
because data on historical ticket pricing structures are currently unavailable. We
thus implicitly assume that pricing levels were equal throughout the country
regardless of regulation or level of competition. This is presumably not true, and the
consequences are worth exploring in follow-up research.
Next to return on investment a number of other variables are taken into account
in the attractiveness function. Amongst those, changes in the level of inequality of
accessibility values proxy the endeavour of in particular government investors to
reduce national disparities in economic opportunity. It is computed as changes in the
Theil index of municipal accessibility levels. This variable takes this form:
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so that differences in the distributions of current accessibility levels Acurri and
accessibility levels A
opt l
i , which include the investment option l, are taken into
account. Thus, Acurri is a measure of accessibility with initial travel times; A
opt l
i
describes accessibility levels when including the travel costs improvements from the
potential investment.
Furthermore, two dichotomous variables indicate whether a link connects to
other links in the entire railway network and in particular to links on the operator’s
network. Connecting to the existing rail network is presumed to add option values
for revenues of later connections to further cities; operational cost reductions for an
operator because inventory can be kept at one centralized point; and furthermore,
operators might consider that having an extensive connected network brings
prestige. Another dichotomous variable indicates whether a link provides a first
connection to provincial capitals or to the country capital city, Amsterdam.
Connecting to these cities might be attractive if investors expected larger growth of
the passenger market in those cities and might have prestige value as well. Yet
another dichotomous variable indicates whether a link connects municipalities on
the country border. This variable represents attempts to profit from international
passenger and mail transport. A last dichotomous variable indicates whether a link
connects to a sea harbour. This variable represents endeavours to connect Dutch sea
harbours with their hinterlands by means of rail for the sake of goods transport.
The built links in the choice set were derived from the database of constructed
railway links. We have used the following definition of a link: a link connects at
least two existing nodes (railway junctions, stations or municipalities) and has been
realized by an investor as one integrated project within a limited number of years.
We assume that the results of the applied models are more accurate in the case of
longer links, and therefore weight the results of Eq. (1) by the length of built link o,
normalized by the average length of all built links in period t so that the total
number of observations in the choice model is not affected. To generate a choice set
of unbuilt links, we applied the following procedure: (1) a set of 50 alternatives was
generated for all links that were built in one decade; (2) to simulate that investors
presumably had limited capital in particular in the early stages of network
development, the costs of railway construction of an alternative could not exceed
the costs of a built railway in a longer period (either 1839–1859, 1859–1889 or
1889–1929); (3) selection of terminating municipalities and the routing of the
intermediate path were not affected by the transport market saturation of
municipalities MS.
Going through the results in Table 2, one finds that private line investors were
focused on high return on investments, while, compared with other alternatives with
reasonably good return on investments, local line and state investments were rather
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indifferent to maximizing their returns on investment. We must note that the results
of an alternative model specification that included passenger mileage change on the
whole network in the return on investment yielded worse results for all operators
Table 2 Results of fitting a conditional logit model on the attributes of the built and automatically
generated unbuilt lines in the Dutch railway network
Scenario A B1
Coefficient Z score Coefficient Z score
Return on investment
Private lines 0.64** (3.84) 1.28** (3.81)
Private local lines 0.11 (0.58) 0.38 (0.79)
State lines 0.46 (1.64) 0.40 (0.81)
Change in accessibility inequality
Private lines 6.59** (3.03) 8.16** (3.10)
Private local lines -21.00** (-3.83) -20.53** (-3.70)
State lines -20.89** (-4.48) -23.20** (-5.10)
Connects operator network
Private lines 1.69 (1.76) 1.69 (1.78)
Private local lines 2.42** (3.11) 2.22** (2.87)
State lines 3.83* (2.57) 4.07** (2.76)
Connects railway network
Private lines -0.65 (-1.05) -0.71 (-1.17)
Private local lines 0.05 (0.12) 0.14 (0.31)
State lines -2.68** (-3.41) -2.77** (-3.36)
First connection to a provincial capital
Private lines 3.86** (4.62) 3.77** (4.55)
Private local lines N/A N/A
State lines -1.67 (-1.34) -1.90 (-1.47)
Connects border zone
Private lines 3.45** (4.96) 3.71** (5.26)
Private local lines -0.59 (-0.52) -0.52 (-0.45)
State lines 0.06 (0.06) -0.10 (-0.10)
Connects sea harbour
Private lines -0.35 (-0.53) -0.43 (-0.64)
Private local lines -0.11 (-0.17) -0.01 (-0.01)
State lines 1.46* (2.15) 1.41* (2.11)
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.57 0.57
AIC 262.95 265.37
Coefficients marked by * are significant at the 0.05 level; those marked by ** are significant at the 0.01
level. All others are not. In the provincial capital variable, coefficients for local lines are missing because
of insufficient variance in the data. The coefficients are set to zero in the later modelling exercise. In
Scenario A, N = 3160; in Scenario B1, N = 3193
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(results available upon request). We thus conclude that, consistent with other
findings (Xie and Levinson 2011), the various operators were primarily preoccupied
with the results for their own network. While private lines increased the disparities
in accessibility in the country, private local lines and state lines aimed to decrease
those disparities. The state presumably had political aims to decrease disparities in
accessibility. These aims were, clearly, further enforced through subsidies and loans
that accompanied the local railway act. All parties aimed to connect their new
investments to their own network. The poor significance values in case of regular
private lines presumably are due to the relatively large number of operators starting
new networks in the early stages of network development. Private investors were
apparently indifferent to whether their networks connected to competitors, while,
surprisingly, state investments actively avoided connecting to other networks.
Establishing the first connection to provincial capitals was sought after by private
investors. Connecting border zones (and, implicitly, foreign railway networks) was
also sought after by private line investors. In contrast, connecting sea harbours was
sought after only by the Dutch state, possibly to provide a stimulus to the Dutch
ports or for defensive purposes. The lack of interest from private parties seems to
confirm that in the Netherlands, there was a very limited market for the overland
transport of goods (Filarski and Mom 2008).
5 Simulation results
The historically built network and the allocation results for various scenarios are
plotted in Figs. 4 and 5. The modelling efforts have yielded networks that are
particularly dense in the Western, most urbanized part of the country. In contrast,
the northern, eastern and southern parts of the country are much less served. In
particular, the southwest of the country seems to gain more investments than built in
reality, while especially lines in the eastern and south-eastern parts of the country
are underrepresented in the modelling results. An in-depth investigation of this bias
is planned in follow-up research.
The differences in network shapes and network ownership are striking. In all
cases, private lines mostly function as trunk lines, with the state providing
peripheral extensions to the trunk network and local lines providing connections
between trunk lines. With the exception of scenario C, local lines do not seem to
have a dominant feeder function. The density of the trunk line network depends on
overarching conditions: for example, with a lower value of / the trunk network
appears to be more extensive (cf. scenario A vs scenario B1). Interestingly, in the
B2 variant, one operator obtains complete monopoly in the private lines and
expands that network much more than happens in a more competitive setting (cf.
scenario B1). Possibly the existence of greater network externalities allows for a
greater density in the final network of the monopolist.
The total cumulative length of the historical and modelled networks is shown in
Fig. 6. It is clear that after the first five investments or so, the model allocates
network investments in smaller chunks than the historically built network, causing
the lower per investment growth of the modelled networks. This bias deserves to be
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Fig. 4 TLS investment allocation results of the scenarios A and C
Fig. 5 TLS investment allocation results of Rietveld and Bruinsma (1998) and the B1, B2, B3, B4
scenario variants
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tackled in follow-up research. In all cases, the modelled networks reach a smaller
length than the historically built network. That the simulated networks are smaller is
either because the modelling framework fails to provide sufficiently attractive
alternatives, or because state involvement and the ensuing fierce competition on the
Dutch railway network caused overinvestment in the network, as suggested by
Knick Harley (1982) and Veenendaal (1995). The latter explanation is further
supported by the B3 and B4 variants which restrict the playing field to two private
parties that are mainly driven by return on investment. In these scenarios, the early
depletion of additions that increase passenger mileage causes much shorter final
networks. Additional evidence can be found in the breakdown of network lengths
per operator type in Appendix 3, which shows a striking dominance of state-built
lines in the historically built network. Lastly, lower growth and shorter final network
length are particularly conspicuous in the Rietveld and Bruinsma network. The
reasons for this are that method’s known bias for short links (Rietveld and Bruinsma


































































Fig. 6 Cumulative lengths of the modelled railway lines according to the scenarios A, B1 and C and the
method proposed by Rietveld and Bruinsma (1998) (above); the cumulative lengths of modelled railway
lines in the B1 to B4 scenarios (below). The cumulative length of the built network has been added to both
graphs for comparison
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removing the a priori selection of connectable cities failed, because the adapted
method only yielded very short connections.
As noted before, two indicators were used in this paper to measure the relative
geographic accuracy of the presented model. The computed accuracy indicators are
plotted against investment sequences in Figs. 7 and 8. Comparing both accuracy
indicators, two contradicting trends become apparent. Where travel-time errors
increase as the railway network develops, connection errors decrease with network
growth, as it becomes more likely the municipalities connected by the random
network coincide with municipalities connected by the historical network. The
simulation results start with a substantial increase in percentage travel-time error.
These errors decrease after roughly 1250 km of allocated railway network. Both
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Fig. 7 Travel-time errors in the scenarios A, B1 and C and the method proposed by Rietveld and
Bruinsma (1998) (above), and travel-time errors in the scenarios B1 to B4 (below). Travel-time errors are
obtained by comparing with the result of the built network at an approximately similar length
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indicates that the model does a better job at reproducing the final form of the
network than it does at the precise sequence of investments; it also shows implicitly
that earlier network additions have a much larger impact on the distribution of travel
times than last additions. We additionally note that, seemingly at odds with the
variation in network shapes, model accuracy hardly changes between scenarios.
This raises the question to what degree the presented weighted travel-time errors are
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Fig. 8 Connection accuracy expressed as percentage of population correctly connected by railway lines
in the scenarios A, B1, C and the method proposed by Rietveld and Bruinsma (1998) (above), and
connection accuracy in the scenarios B1 to B4 (below). Connection accuracies are obtained by comparing
with the result of the built network at an approximately similar length
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6 Closing remarks
This paper presents transport link scanner, a model that simulates the expansion of
transport networks. Based on a conditional logit method, the model repeatedly
selects one most attractive link from a choice set to add to the expanding network.
That choice set is generated using heuristics with the goal to obtain a limited set of
relevant, geographically plausible links. The model outlined in this paper explicitly
allows the empirical estimation of preferences in a context with multiple actors with
possibly different characteristics. It allows to test, amongst others, the impact of
investor preferences, transport revenue structures and network effects on the final
outcomes of a transport network.
A practical application of the model is presented as well. This exercise focuses
on the expansion of the Dutch railway network in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century and compares the model’s accuracy with a previous attempt by
Rietveld and Bruinsma (1998). The results presented show that the early expansion
of the Dutch railway network is simulated by TLS with similar accuracy as by
Rietveld and Bruinsma, without the necessity of an a priori selection of
connectable cities. The results corroborate findings that transport network
expansion follows a clear rationale (Rietveld and Bruinsma 1998; Xie and
Levinson 2011; Levinson et al. 2012), show that the modelling rationale can
simulate network expansion processes with some success and illustrate that
institutional and economic settings may have a profound effect on network
expansion outcomes. Future research may be necessary to further improve the
accuracy of the model and measure its performance in terms of characteristic
spatial network metrics (Rodrigue et al. 2006). One other useful addition would be
the inclusion of socially optimal networks (Li et al. 2010) that would enable
exploration of how competitive investment decisions can be directed towards social
optima (Anshelevich et al. 2003). Nevertheless, we conclude that the model
appears to become a useful tool for academic studies and policy evaluations.
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Appendix 1: Transport link construction costs
In the choice set generation and in the estimation of investment attractiveness, the
construction costs of distinct investments come into play. In this study, the costs that
are taken into account are a fixed cost and costs linked with the geography that the
proposed link overcomes. For the sake of simplicity, the costs for maintenance,
personnel and inventory are currently ignored in the model. In the case study, the
costs of constructing a link have been estimated using an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression of the following equation:
Cl ¼ b0RIVERl þ b1HARDSOILSl þ b2SOFTSOILSl þ e ð20Þ
in which guilders of recorded costs of nineteenth-century rail construction
projects in the Netherlands are explained by a constant and traversed metres of
river, hard and soft soils. The hard soils class contains gravel, sand and loam.
The soft soils class contains clay and peat. The recorded costs describe the costs
imbued by the Dutch state in a number of network expansions between 1860 and
1880. These costs have been inflated to the 1913 level and are assumed to be
fixed (in real terms) over time. For the comparison of investment options, the
geographic distribution of cost factors is much more important than temporal
variations. Therefore, we expect that this assumption does not substantially
affect the results of this article. The OLS estimation results are given in Table 3.
Unfortunately, the exact locations of built-up land in the Netherlands in the
nineteenth century and the costs of building railways through such built-up areas
are not precisely known, so that we cannot model the presumably high costs of
constructing railways in already urbanized areas. We note, however, that the
Netherlands were a mainly rural country in the nineteenth century. Moreover,
railway stations and railway lines were mainly built at the edges of the then
existing cities.
Table 3 Estimated factors
contributing to the costs of
constructing a railway line
* Estimates significant at the
0.05 level. N = 38. R2 = 0.14
Coefficient t statistics
Constant 1,980,280.00* 2.39
Meter of river 2760.61 1.76
Meter of hard soil 12.38 0.55
Meter of soft soil 64.57* 2.57
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Appendix 2: Passenger transport revenues
We assume that all links in the Dutch railway network have been built for the purpose
of maximizing passenger transport profits (Veenendaal 2008; Filarski and Mom
2008). Clearly, return on investment played an important role in the development of
the Dutch railway network. Revenues of railway network construction are computed
here as increases in passenger mileage on an investor’s network. Estimating these
returns requires repetitively estimating a spatial interaction model and allocating the
resulting flows on various proposed network configurations. The spatial interaction
model applied in the case study is based on empirically obtained parameters and,
amongst others, the assumptions that: (1) increasing interaction opportunities cause
growth in the propensity of people to travel and (2) no restrictions are imposed on the
number of trips into zones because train travellers’ motives for visiting specific zones
are unknown. Alonso’s GTM enables parameterization of the degree to which
opportunities and competition or congestion affect demand and encompasses all
variants of Wilson’s family of spatial interaction models as special cases (De Vries
et al. 2001). We do not take the effects of competition or congestion at the destination
into account, so that we effectively apply:








where Tij represents observed passenger trips from i to j, Ai indicates origin-specific
potential accessibility, P is population size, and f ðcijÞ is a travel cost decay function.
In the model, the number of trips going to a specific destination is not restricted, so
that h is set to one. The function f ðcijÞ and subsequently the value of c are estimated
in two steps as proposed by De Vries et al. (2002). We first estimate f ðcijÞ by
regressing the log specification of a singly constrained gravity model, as proposed
by Fotheringham and O’Kelly (1989):
ln Tij
 
¼ diOi þ a1 ln Pj
 þ b1 ln cij
 þ eij ð23Þ
where cij denotes the shortest travel time from i to j, and Oi is an origin-specific
fixed-effect dummy. To estimate this spatial interaction model that may include zero
flow observations, we use ln Tij þ 0:5
 
to replace ln Tij
 
as suggested by Sen and
So¨o¨t (1981). We have estimated the distance-decay parameter in both exponential
and power specifications of the distance-decay function. The latter consistently
yielded better results. Data on travel flows were obtained from sold train tickets
between the 14 stations on the Amsterdam to Rotterdam rail line (HSM 1889).
These data are reproduced in Table 4. We find that f ðcijÞ ¼ s1:777ij and use this to
compute Ai, as defined in Eq. (22). Although changing the distance-decay parameter
substantially influences absolute marginal returns, we find that the ratios of the
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marginal returns of different lines are hardly affected. The value of b appears to
have only a small impact on our findings.2 We subsequently regress:
ln Tij
 
 ln Pið Þ  ln Pj
  ln s1:777ij
 
¼ 1 cð Þ ln Aið Þ þ e: ð24Þ
All results of demand model estimation are presented in Table 5. T has a 0.3
elasticity to both accessibility and travel cost. This means that the total number of
trips originating in i increases when the accessibility of i increases. To assess the
impact of model specification on the results of the later choice analysis, we
alternatively analyse link railway construction choices when changes in travel cost
only cause substitution at the origin (i.e. c is set to zero), which implies that railway
investments do not affect the total number of trips.
A multiple-path logit model is subsequently used to allocate flows to the network




with Pr being the probability that a traveller chooses path r; and Vr and Vh
describing the travel values of path r and all paths h, respectively. Alternative paths
are generated by means of a link elimination method (Bekhor et al. 2006). In the
case study, the utility of paths is defined as Vr ¼ aðcrÞ; with a\0 and c indicating
travel times. As the interaction data available for the case study do not allow
estimation of the utility parameter, we resort to other literature. A parameter from
Vrtic and Axhausen (2002) is applied, which is -2.398 (for hourly increases of
travel time). We use this parameter in Eq. (25) because it is estimated on longer
distance train trips, implying a similar context as in our study.
Appendix 3: Results per operator type
In this appendix, simulation results per operator type are discussed for the scenarios
A, B1 and C, and where relevant also for the results of the Rietveld and Bruinsma
(1998) model. The emphasis is put on scenario comparison and implications for
network expansion modelling.
Table 5 Parameters estimated from sold railway tickets on the Amsterdam to Rotterdam line in 1888
a t b t R2 N
Equation (23) 0.825 26.33 -1.777 -18.97 0.989 182
c t R2 N
Equation (24) – – 0.304 41.44 0.905 182
All parameters are significant at the 0.01 level
2 The results are available on request.
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In Fig. 9, the lengths of the state-built network in the scenarios discussed are
shown as shares of total network length. From the results, it is clear that, in contrast
to the historically built network, all networks modelled obtain a much smaller share
of state-built links. Larger values of / result in larger state involvement, presumably
because potential investments with good return on investment are depleted faster.
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Kilometres of modelled railway lines
Scenario A Scenario B1 Scenario C Scenario "Rietveld and Bruinsma (1998)"
Fig. 10 Mean percentage error in travel time on regular private railway lines
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particularly striking. State involvement was relatively early because network
expansion in the study area was particularly slow at the start (see Veenendaal 1995).
This was the case either because of market imperfections left out of consideration,
or because of the almost exclusive reliance of the transport network on passenger
transport that yielded poor absolute revenues.
Figures 10, 11 and 12 show the mean errors in travel time when only considering



























Kilometres of modelled railway lines
Scenario A Scenario B1 Scenario C































Kilometres of modelled railway lines
Scenario A Scenario B1 Scenario C
Fig. 12 Mean percentage error in travel time on local private lines
Transport link scanner: simulating geographic transport… 297
123
respectively. The travel times on the subnets are compared with similar subnets of
the historically built network in which the total reference network is about as long as
the total network modelled. Thus, the demonstrated mean errors reflect both
discrepancies in shares per operator type and errors in travel times modelled. From
these results, it is clear that the scenarios B1 and C are the best performers, thus
leading to the conclusion that a value of u of at least five has been obtained by the
railways. When comparing the different operator types, the population-weighted
errors presented here mostly reflect the transport relevance of the various operator
types. Regular private lines served the largest cities, and network allocation errors
on the regular private networks consequently cause emphasized relative errors. In
contrast, the errors on state and local lines have a much lower weight.
Appendix 4: Nomenclature
Ai Interaction options at the origin (destination accessibility)
Alternative Potential addition to the network represented by a link
Base Network before introduction of modelled transport mode or characteristic of existing
transport mode
Bj Interaction options at the destination (origin accessibility)
C Construction costs of link or segment
c Generalized travel cost of link or segment
cp Penalty for entering and exiting the introduced transport mode
curr Network state at start of model iteration
est(x) Estimated network state with treated investment choice in place (multiple versions
indicated by x)
i Origin municipality
INEQACC Changes in the Theil’s index of accessibility due to a considered investment option
intr Characteristic of introduced transport mode
Investor Agent deciding on investments and obtaining revenues from the investment
j Destination municipality
k Parameter used while iterating plausible paths with changing importance of path length
L Length of link or segment
Link (l) Connection between two municipalities (i and j) physically represented by a path
MS Market saturation of i or j, computed as potential number of trips to be gained from link
connection given the current and future network state
Operator Agent deciding on investments and obtaining revenues from the investment
Option Potential addition to the network represented by a link, considered for investment by an
investor
P Municipal population
Path Combination of segments that forms the physical representation of an alternative
R Crudely estimated revenues of a link or segment, instrumental in the generation of plausible
paths, computed by averaging connected population multiplied with MS
RC Revenue-cost indicators per segment, instrumental in the generation of plausible paths,
computed as ratio of R versus C
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RCR Factor to be optimized in choice set generation computed as ratio of estimated increase in
passenger mileage versus the costs of link construction
ROI An alternative’s expected return on investment, computed as the ratio between estimated
transport flows on the investor’s network and the costs of constructing the alternative
Segment
(s)
Individual, unseparable lines from which paths are composed
T Trips between municipalities i and j
V Speed of transport mode
WCE Population-weighted connection error, used as accuracy indicator
WMAPE Population-weighted average errors in travel times between municipalities, used as
accuracy indicator
Z Selection dummy used to obtain a limited set of alternatives in the first step of choice set
generation
B Parameter governing distance-decay model
c Parameter governing transport consumption elasticity to travel cost at the origin
d Parameter governing trip production for each municipality as a fixed effect
# Parameter governing congestion effects at destination on destination attractiveness
/ Parameter indicating relative travel cost decrease offered by introduced transport mode
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